Several locations needed to guard against early usage of the new issuers
endpoint pre-migration.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

We need a write lock around writes to ensure serialization of
modifications. We use a single lock for both issuer and key
updates, in part because certain operations (like deletion) will
potentially affect both.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

 - Address an issue that we were scheduling the rebuilding of a CRL on standby
   nodes, which would not be able to write to storage.
 - Fix an issue with standby nodes not correctly determining that a migration previously
   occurred.

 - Hook into the backend invalidation function so that secondaries are notified of
   new/updated issuer or migrations occuring on the primary cluster. Upon notification
   schedule a CRL rebuild to take place upon the next process to read/update the CRL
   or within the periodic function if no request comes in.

* Add aliased path for root/rotate/:exported

This adds a user-friendly path name for generating a rotated root. We
automatically choose the name "next" for the newly generated root at
this path if it doesn't already exist.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

* Add aliased path for intermediate/cross-sign

This allows cross-signatures to work.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

* Add path for replacing the current root

This updates default to point to the value of the issuer with name
"next" rather than its current value.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

* Remove plural issuers/ in signing paths

These paths use a single issuer and thus shouldn't include the plural
issuers/ as a path prefix, instead using the singular issuer/ path
prefix.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

* Only warn if default issuer was imported

When the default issuer was not (re-)imported, we'd fail to find it,
causing an extraneous warning about missing keys, even though this
issuer indeed had a key.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

* Add missing issuer sign/issue paths
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

* These parts work (put in signature so that backend wouldn't break, but missing fields, desc, etc.)

* Import and Generate API calls w/ needed additions to SDK.

* make fmt

* Add Help/Sync Text, fix some of internal/exported/kms code.

* Fix PEM/DER Encoding issue.

* make fmt

* Standardize keyIdParam, keyNameParam, keyTypeParam

* Add error response if key to be deleted is in use.

* replaces all instances of "default" in code with defaultRef

* Updates from Callbacks to Operations Function with explicit forwarding.

* Fixes a panic with names not being updated everywhere.

* add a logged error in addition to warning on deleting default key.

* Normalize whitespace upon importing keys.
Authored-by: Alexander Scheel <alexander.m.scheel@gmail.com>

* Fix isKeyInUse functionality.

* Fixes tests associated with newline at end of key pem.

The backend Framework has updated Callbacks (used extensively in PKI) to
become deprecated; Operations takes their place and clarifies forwarding
of requests.

We switch to the new format everywhere, updating some bad assumptions
about forwarding along the way. Anywhere writes are handled (that should
be propagated to all nodes in all clusters), we choose to forward the
request all the way up to the performance primary cluster's primary
node. This holds for issuers/keys, roles, and configs (such as CRL
config, which is globally set for all clusters despite all clusters
having their own separate CRL).
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

Vault previously strictly enforced NotAfter/ttl values on certificate
requests, erring if the requested TTL extended past the NotAfter date of
the issuer. In the event of issuing an intermediate, this behavior was
ignored, instead permitting the issuance.

Users generally do not think to check their issuer's NotAfter date when
requesting a certificate; thus this behavior was generally surprising.

Per RFC 5280 however, issuers need to maintain status information
throughout the life cycle of the issued cert. If this leaf cert were to
be issued for a longer duration than the parent issuer, the CA must
still maintain revocation information past its expiration.

Thus, we add an option to the issuer to change the desired behavior:

 - err, to err out,
 - permit, to permit the longer NotAfter date, or
 - truncate, to silently truncate the expiration to the issuer's
   NotAfter date.

Since expiration of certificates in the system's trust store are not
generally validated (when validating an arbitrary leaf, e.g., during TLS
validation), permit should generally only be used in that case. However,
browsers usually validate intermediate's validity periods, and thus
truncate should likely be used (as with permit, the leaf's chain will
not validate towards the end of the issuance period).
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

When a role is used to generate a certificate (such as with the sign/
and issue/ legacy paths or the legacy sign-verbatim/ paths), we prefer
that issuer to the one on the request. This allows operators to set an
issuer (other than default) for requests to be issued against,
effectively making the change no different from the users' perspective
as it is "just" a different role name.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

This merges the ca_chain JSON field (of the /certs/ca_chain path) with
the regular certificate field, returning the root of trust always. This
also affects the non-JSON (raw) endpoints as well.

We return the default issuer's chain here, rather than all known issuers
(as that may not form a strict chain).
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

 - Some PR feedback and handle a case in which the primary cluster does
   not have a CA bundle within storage but somehow a secondary does.

 - Track the migration state forbidding an issuer/key writing api call if we have not migrated
 - For operations that just need to read the CA bundle, use the same tracking variable to
   switch between reading the legacy bundle or use the new key/issuer storage.
 - Add an invalidation function that will listen for updates to our log path to refresh the state
   on secondary clusters.

 - Leverage an existing helper method within the PKI backend tests to setup a PKI backend with storage.

We add a new API endpoint to fetch the specified issuer's CRL directly
(rather than the default issuer's CRL at /crl and /certs/crl). We also
add a new test to validate the CRL in a multi-root scenario and ensure
it is signed with the correct keys.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

In previous versions of Vault, it was possible to sign an empty CRL
(when the CRL was disabled and a force-rebuild was requested). Add a
comment about this case.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

When using the older Certificate.CreateCRL(...) call, Go's x509 library
copies the parsed pkix.Name version of the CRL Issuer's Subject field.
For certain constructed CAs, this fails since pkix.Name is not suitable
for round-tripping. This also builds a CRLv1 (per RFC 5280) CRL.

In updating to the newer x509.CreateRevocationList(...) call, we can
construct the CRL in the CRLv2 format and correctly copy the issuer's
name. However, this requires holding an additional field per-CRL, the
CRLNumber field, which is required in Go's implementation of CRLv2
(though OPTIONAL in the spec). We store this on the new
LocalCRLConfigEntry object, per-CRL.
Co-authored-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

This updates fetchCertBySerial to support querying the default issuer's
CRL.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

When building CRLs, we've gotta make sure certs issued by that issuer
land up on that issuer's CRL and not some other CRL. If no CRL is
found (matching a cert), we'll place it on the default CRL.
However, in the event of equivalent issuers (those with the same subject
AND the same key  material) -- perhaps due to reissuance -- we'll only
create a single (unified) CRL for them.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

 keyId -> keyID
 issuerId -> issuerID
 key -> keyEntry
 issuer -> issuerEntry
 keyConfig -> keyConfigEntry
 issuerConfig -> issuerConfigEntry

We wish to ensure that each desired certificate in the chain is only
present once.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

Don't set the legacy IssuingCA field on the certificate bundle, as we
prefer the CAChain field over it.

Additionally, building the full chain could result in duplicate
certificates when the CAChain included the leaf certificate itself. When
building the full chain, ensure we don't include the bundle's
certificate twice.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

This ensures each issuer is only a single certificate entry (as
validated by count and parsing) without any trailing data.

We further ensure that each certificate PEM has leading and trailing
spaces removed with only a single trailing new line remaining.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

We break the clique, instead building these chains manually, ensuring
that the remaining chains do not change and only the modified certs
change. We then reset them (back to implicit chain building) and ensure
we get the same results as earlier.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

With the new issuer field (manual_chain), we can no longer err when a
name already exists: we might be updating the existing issuer (with the
same name), but changing its manual_chain field. Detect this error and
correctly handle it.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

Using the issuance infrastructure, we generate new certificates (either
roots or intermediates), positing that this is roughly equivalent to
importing an external bundle (minus error handling during partial
imports). This allows us to incrementally construct complex chains,
creating reissuance cliques and cross-signing cycles.

By using ECDSA certificates, we avoid high signature verification and
key generation times.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

This returns the CA Chain attribute of an issuer, showing its computed
chain based on other issuers in the database, when fetching a specific
issuer.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

With the one-entry-per-issuer approach, CA Chains become implicitly
constructed from the pool of issuers. This roughly matches the existing
expectations from /config/ca (wherein a chain could be provided) and
/intemediate/set-signed (where a chain may be provided). However, in
both of those cases, we simply accepted a chain. Here, we need to be
able to reconstruct the chain from parts on disk.

However, with potential rotation of roots, we need to be aware of
disparate chains. Simply concating together all issuers isn't
sufficient. Thus we need to be able to parse a certificate's Issuer and
Subject field and reconstruct valid (and potentially parallel)
parent<->child mappings.

This attempts to handle roots, intermediates, cross-signed
intermediates, cross-signed roots, and rotated keys (wherein one might
not have a valid signature due to changed key material with the same
subject).
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

 - Since the elements of the struct were not exported we serialized an empty
   migration log to disk and would re-run the migration

When importing complex chains, we should identify in which certificate
or key the failure occurred.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>

 - Add a call to buildCRL if we created an issuer within pathImportIssuers
 - Augment existing FullCAChain to verify we have a proper CRL post set-signed api call
 - Remove a code block writing out "ca" storage entry that is no longer used.

 - Detail I missed from the RFC was to assign the Name field as "current" for migrated key and issuer.

 - Validate that generate/root calls are no longer idempotent, but the bundle importing
   does not generate new keys/issuers
 - As before make sure that the delete root api resets everything
 - Address a bug within the storage that we bombed when we had multiple different
   key types within storage.